History of LASD Officer Survival Training

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Officer Survival – In the Beginning

On September 5, 1967, Mike McAndrews began his career with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department as a cadet in Academy Class 119. He endured months of lectures, training, and tests. From their first day in the Academy, cadets in Class 119 saw posters on the walls with survival quotes such as, "The more you sweat in training, the less you bleed in the streets" and "The radio is your lifeline." (The only radio available to patrol deputies at the time was in the radio car. Portable radios were not issued to deputies until years later.)

To reinforce officer survival lessons throughout their academy training, drill instructors demanded cadets carry nothing in their gun hand so they would be free to draw their weapon at any given moment. During physical training, falling out on a run meant dying in a street fight. The message was clear: There is nothing more important than officer survival.

Finally, the day of their first officer survival lecture arrived. Every member of Class 119 was eager to hear what would be said. Their instructor was a staff member from another class. The officer survival lecture was his specialty. His uniform appearance was magnificent and everything was perfect up until the moment he opened his mouth.

His first move was to walk to an easel and pull the cover off a poster-size picture of a nude male dead body laid out on a coroner's examination table. The truly shocking part was not the dead body; it was the instructor's next statement. "That's Deputy _____. He died because he made a mistake. He was stupid and got killed."

It was unthinkable that an academy instructor would defile the memory of a young deputy sheriff who was killed in the line of duty and call it officer survival training. For many of the cadets, the lecture was over. McAndrews knew that was not the proper way to teach officer survival. He didn't know it then, but years down the line he would become one of the premier instructors teaching officer survival training.

The Blame Game

The Sheriff's Department was not the only department playing the blame game. In 1963, two experienced Los Angeles Police Officers, Ian Campbell and Karl Hettinger, conducted a traffic stop that would change law enforcement forever. During the traffic stop, Officer Campbell was disarmed, and as he was held at gunpoint, Officer Hettinger surrendered his weapon. They were taken to an onion field where Campbell was murdered. Hettinger escaped and the suspects were captured, tried, and convicted. Officer Hettinger was ordered to attend every briefing at all of LAPD's patrol stations and explain what he did and how it cost his partner his life. The lesson learned from this incident and taught to law enforcement officers around the country was to never surrender your weapon.

Cause for Concern

In the 1960s and 70s, citizens were confronting authority and challenging the status quo. The national crime rate was on the rise, and protests related to such things as the civil rights movement, Vietnam War, and the sexual revolution increased confrontations with law enforcement. Many of these confrontations were armed, violent, and deadly. Between 1960 and 1969, more than 670 law enforcement officers in the U.S. were killed by gunfire. From 1970 to 1979, that number nearly doubled to more than 1,200 officers killed. Law enforcement was considered the establishment, and police officers were dying because of that.

Many of the old officer survival training models were outdated and ineffective. The surge in police officer deaths could not be explained away with empty slogans such as, "The officer made a mistake" or "He died because he was stupid." There had to be reasons other than human error and simple-minded police officers.

Homicide Bureau

Several years later, while Deputy McAndrews was working Firestone Station, deputies from Firestone Station, as well as officers from other jurisdictions, had been shot and killed. During that time, there was always a mystery surrounding the circumstances of police shootings. LASD Homicide detectives were conducting many of the investigations, but they were not forthcoming as to how these shootings occurred. Deputies learned more from the LA Times than they did from their own Department.

Homicide kept everyone in the dark. Deputies only heard rumors and speculation, but nothing official or concrete. There was always the hint the dead officer had somehow made a mistake or used poor judgment.

Many of the deputies knew the officers involved in the shootings. They were smart, brave, and tactically sound. The answer as to how they died could not simply be because they screwed up. There had to be specific causes.

It is easy to understand Homicide's reticence to discuss their cases at that time. Homicide's mission was to investigate, prosecute, and convict the cop killers. Understandably, it was not part of the detectives' mission to develop and teach officer survival tactics. The last thing Homicide wanted was to have other Department units investigating officer-involved shootings. Another unit's reports and theories would be subject to discovery and disclosure to the lawyers defending the accused murderer. Homicide is, and always has been, fiercely protective of its investigations. While deputies wanted answers, Homicide investigators were focused on preventing leaks and convicting the officer's killer.

Four CHP Officers Killed

On April 5, 1970, shortly before midnight, a traffic stop resulted in the deaths of four CHP officers. This tragic incident forever changed tactics, equipment, and officer survival training throughout the United States.

CHP officers Walt Frago and Roger Gore received a call of a man brandishing a gun in the Newhall area. The officers located the vehicle and conducted a traffic stop. Suspects Jack Twinning and Bobby Davis exited the vehicle and killed the two officers. A few minutes later, CHP Officers George Alleyn and James Pence arrived to back up the first unit. When they arrived, the suspects immediately fired upon them, and in the ensuing gun battle, both officers were killed. A later review of this horrific event revealed several issues that may have helped the officers survive. Because of this tragedy, law enforcement training changed around the country.

When this incident occurred, the officers were carrying ammo dump pouches that, when opened, dumped six rounds into the officer's hand. The revolvers were then loaded one bullet at a time. After this incident, speedy loaders began being issued to officers, which allowed them to reload six rounds into the revolvers all at once. Officers also began carrying backup weapons. If their service weapon ran out of ammo, they could retrieve their backup weapon and continue firing. Tactics also

changed. Instead of having both officers approach at once, one officer approached while the other provided cover. At that time, CHP officers had a red band attached around the lever of the shotgun. If the shotgun was racked to place a round in the chamber, it broke the seal. When this occurred, a memo had to be written to justify why a round had been loaded into the chamber. In this incident, it probably prevented the officer from racking a round, even during such a deadly situation.

Expertise

On the Sheriff's Department, Lieutenants Bob Edmonds and Jerry Harper had discussed the dramatic increase in officers killed in the line of duty. They decided the deaths of officers should be investigated to determine the cause, and that information should then be shared with patrol personnel to improve their officer survival skills. They couldn't choose just anyone to research this information and present it to deputies. It was important to choose someone with enough expertise to conduct a tactical, yet timely, investigation of the officer's death. If they chose someone who was inexperienced, it might only add to the confusion surrounding the murder of a police officer.

Lieutenants Edmonds and Harper decided that Sergeants Dale Underwood and Dave Kushner were the most experienced investigators to conduct this in-depth research. They approached Underwood and Kushner with the assignment, explaining its goal was to determine any contributing causal factors and to document the results for officer survival training purposes.

Lieutenants Edmonds and Harper arranged for Underwood and Kushner to meet with Lieutenant Bob Smitson from LAPD who had already begun investigating LAPD's officer-involved shootings resulting in officer deaths. LAPD and the Sheriff's Department wanted to work together to make the job safer for everyone. When conducting his investigations, Smitson interviewed everyone involved to determine any mitigating circumstances and then wrote up a scenario that could be used in training. Smitson provided Underwood and Kushner with two of these scenarios.

It was important for the officer survival researchers to keep in mind the Homicide investigators' concerns that the information they gathered was discoverable by the suspect's defense.

Shortly after Sergeants Underwood and Kushner began their research, Kushner transferred to Homicide Bureau and was replaced by Sergeant Carrol Hogue.

Sergeants Underwood and Hogue began investigating officer-involved shootings resulting in officer deaths, as well as assaults on officers, to determine how and why they occurred. The information they gathered was adapted into training scenarios. These scenarios were reenacted for the first time at Firestone Station so patrol deputies could see firsthand how an officer was killed. Deputies at Firestone Station spread the word about how effective this training was, and when deputies at other stations heard about the training, they requested that it be presented at their facility. Deputies told their friends from other police departments, and those agencies began requesting the training as well.

Causal Factors

Lieutenant John Kolman transferred to Training Bureau and began examining officer-involved shootings from the Sheriff's Department as well as other law enforcement agencies around the country, hoping to determine if there were common causal factors. During the research, he determined that all of the officer deaths were caused by one or more of six causal factors.

Six Causal Effects of Officers Being Injured or Killed

1. Lack of Prior Planning
2. Lack of Communication between Partners
3. Splitting of Partners
4. Lack of Familiarity with Equipment
5. Tactical Error
6. Overconfidence

Whenever an officer-involved shooting occurred, Kolman would obtain as much information as possible from many sources including interviewing those involved. Homicide investigators were very helpful, providing facts on a shooting as well as offering their opinion on what could have been done differently.

The "5 Cs"

While Deputy Carrol Hogue was teaching officer survival training, he was also writing officer survival articles that were published in the Star News. As memory aids to help responding deputies quickly establish an effective initial containment of a potentially violent situation, he developed the 5 Cs:

Contain – establish containment of the situation, both to control the suspect's escape and to keep people from entering a dangerous area.

Coordinate – work with responding units and other resources (e.g., Aero, SEB, negotiators, K9, bomb squad) to establish containment and control.

Communicate – clearly and quickly communicate the handling unit's intent and any changes in the situation.

Command – take assertive command of responding units and of the situation.

Control – assert control over the situation by managing units and resources.

The 6th "C" – Critique

Years later, the 6th "C" – Critique – was added to remind deputies and supervisors to hold after-action briefings to better learn from critical incidents.

The 7th "C" – Contingency Planning

After working at the Tactics and Survival Unit, Deputies Chris Branuelas, Mary Michel, and Mike Reynolds were promoted to sergeant and later worked together at Lakewood Sheriff's Station. One day, Sergeants Branuelas and Michel were on a containment of an armed, barricaded suspect. As they awaited the arrival of the Special Enforcement Bureau, the suspect suddenly shoved his 3-year-old child out the front door of his home. This unexpected development not only forced them to conduct a hasty rescue of the toddler before SEB arrived, it revealed a gap in the current protocol. Training had focused on containment, with virtually nothing about handling a dynamic or changing situation.

For years, the 5 Cs had been a cornerstone of training, but Branuelas realized they only prepared deputies to manage an incident from containment to the arrival of SEB. A situation may appear static but could quickly change, and deputies were ill-prepared to deal with a fluctuating dynamic. If the suspect acted, they needed to be ready to respond. An examination of possible suspect actions revealed six changes for which they needed to be prepared:

1) **Attempt to Escape** – Although a good containment was designed to prevent this, was it physically capable of controlling an escape, say by vehicle?

2) **Surrender** – Since suspects had previously used victims or hostages to feign surrender to distract or lure deputies from cover, deputies needed to be in place to safely take an "apparently" surrendering suspect into custody.

3) **Commit Suicide** – This frequent action by a suspect could trigger a defensive response from deputies, believing a suspect was attacking them or a hostage.

4) **Attack Containment Deputies** (including from outside intervention such as layoff suspects or terrorists) – Were proper cover and concealment being used and were weapons deployed to successfully win an armed assault?

5) **Communicate** – Were deputies prepared to effectively communicate with suspects prior to the arrival of trained negotiators?

6) **Take or Harm Hostages** – Were deputies staged and ready to quickly and effectively confront and intervene if suspects attempted to take or harm hostages?

In order that field deputies be better trained to safely manage critical situations, Sergeants Branuelas, Reynolds, and Michel researched past incidents. In February 1999, Branuelas began using these six points to teach field supervisors and deputies how to prepare for a changing containment. His class on managing critical incidents included the new concept of a 7th "C" – Contingency Planning. Essentially, success in handling a dynamic incident would depend on how well deputies prepared for those six potentials.

In the 7th C, deputies learned to rapidly prepare contingency plans once containment was established. One element included staging and equipping a team to respond in case the suspect became violent. Attempts should be made to communicate with the suspect to gain information and perhaps defuse the situation. When possible, a floor plan of the building should be obtained and preparations made for a rapid response by assigning each team member a specific task.

Deputies must consider "defensibility" when choosing containment positions. Their own cover and concealment, the distance between a potentially escaping or attacking suspect, and the suspect's cover and armament were necessary considerations. Their ability to maneuver to another location of cover if necessary, and whether back-up deputies could reach them, was also taught.

The initial training was given prior to rifles being fielded and involved long rifles and shotguns being distributed at key points of the containment.

In 1999, there was resistance to the idea that field deputies may need to enter a containment and confront an armed hostage-taker prior to the arrival of SEB. That concept did not fit with previous training. However, two months after the first class on managing critical incidents, a mass shooting occurred at Columbine High School in Colorado. That shooting changed the way police responded to and managed what were later termed "active shooter" incidents. No longer would law enforcement contain the location and wait for special weapons teams; now they took action, searching for and confronting the suspects. The Columbine shooting and others since then significantly changed our field tactics and reinforced what Branuelas had been teaching. The 7th C was formally adopted into the Department's tactics training.

Reenactments

One of the training methods Lieutenant Kolman used to get deputies' attention was to have deputies reenact the traffic stop where the four CHP officers were killed. To make the reenactment more believable, blanks were fired from the guns, and Kolman created fake blood using Caro syrup and red dye. Every detail was covered in order to make the traffic stop and shooting look believable. Afterward, in the classroom, the photo of the four CHP officers in uniform lying side by side on the slab in the coroner's office was shown to drive the point home. The deputies involved in the reenactments were Bob Coskill, Joe Callanan, Bob Kostka, Mike McAndrews, Carrol Hogue, and Dale Underwood.

Blank Firing Revolvers

Deputy Sam Marino obtained revolvers from Central Property that had been confiscated. The revolvers were modified to fire blanks and then used in role playing. The cylinders of each revolver were pinned so that only shorter blank rounds could be inserted into each chamber. Live rounds would not fit or allow the cylinder to close. Another precaution taken was to plug the barrel of the weapon. An opening was bored into the underside of the revolver's barrel in order for the gases and flame from the blank round firing to escape downward. This prevented injuries and allowed the person in front of the barrel to remain safe, since the exhaust from the blank went downward instead of in their direction. Because of

the concern for safety, it took months for Kolman and Marino to receive approval to use the blank-firing weapons in training.

A New Era

One day, when Deputy McAndrews was sitting with other deputies in the briefing room at Firestone Station, Sergeant Underwood walked in and shut the door. He picked up a piece of chalk, approached the chalkboard, and proceeded to explain the circumstances surrounding the recent shooting death of a police officer. The officer was from another agency, but deputies at the briefing had read about his shooting in the local newspapers.

As Sergeant Underwood laid out the facts of the officer's murder, he diagramed the scene on the chalkboard. No one said a word during Underwood's fifteen-minute presentation. The briefing room was absolutely silent. The only sounds were Underwood's voice and the chalk rubbing across the chalkboard.

Sergeant Underwood didn't attach any mistakes to the officer's actions, nor did he use the word "stupid." This was a change, a big change, in how officer survival would be taught in the future. McAndrews felt that Underwood was risking his career by explaining this shooting to them.

In another sign of change, Dean Wert, Firestone Station's captain, invited LAPD Lieutenant Bob Smitson to speak at a station meeting on the subject of officer survival. LASD and LAPD have always had a cordial, but competitive, relationship. To invite a lieutenant from LAPD to talk to the deputies assigned to the busiest station in Los Angeles County was not only unheard of, it was risky. Captain Wert knew what he was doing. Deputies said that Captain Wert was one of the finest men they had ever known.

Lieutenant Smitson's presentation was unlike anything the deputies had ever heard. Like Sergeant Underwood, Smitson did not use the words "mistake" or "stupid" in explaining the officers' actions. It was clear that LAPD officers were noticing the same changes that deputies were seeing. More importantly, Underwood, Kolman, and Smitson were talking to each other, and soon all the deputies would be listening.

In-Service Training

The information was so well accepted that word quickly spread to other stations. John Kolman, Dale Underwood, and Mike McAndrews traveled around the county, lecturing at different sheriff's stations. The training consisted of placing deputies in reenactments of actual shootings. These training sessions took place in industrial areas after businesses were closed. Deputies were issued blank-firing revolvers, which resembled their own on-duty weapons. All the scenarios they encountered were taken from actual deputy-involved shootings. The training sessions were eventually conducted during both daytime and nighttime hours.

Word Spread

Officer-involved shootings weren't just a concern for the Sheriff's Department. Many smaller agencies were also concerned for their officers' safety, so they approached the Sheriff's Department for advice and training. Since there was no overtime available at the time, Lieutenant Kolman and other deputies spent their off-duty hours conducting officer survival training for outside police agencies. They were so well respected that they were requested to lecture to peace officers from throughout the state at the California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI), which was under the Governor's Office.

The California Specialized Training Institute

The California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI) at San Luis Obispo is one of the most prestigious training institutions in the United States. Police departments from all over the United States wait years for a spot in one of CSTI's classes. More than forty years ago, Lieutenant Kolman and Sergeant Underwood started an unbroken chain of LASD officer survival instructors at CSTI that exists to this day. Other police departments, including LAPD, invited Kolman and Underwood to teach at their training days. Kolman was also asked to teach officer survival training to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) special agents.

"Never Give Up"

In the middle of the night of December 23, 1976, Lieutenant Bob Edmonds called Lieutenant John Kolman at home and told him that Deputies George Arthur and Mike Waters had been involved in a shooting in Firestone's area and were being treated at Saint Francis Hospital. Both Arthur and Waters requested that Kolman come and talk to them. When Kolman arrived, Arthur and Waters said, "We just wanted to thank you because we think you saved our lives." They went on to explain how Kolman's lecture told them to never give up. Despite their injuries

from being shot and severely pistol whipped, they remembered his words, "I don't care how bad you're hurt, you never give up!" Recalling these words, they were inspired to continue to fight until they gained the upper hand to shoot and kill the suspects.

Academy Training

In the summer of 1971, Deputy McAndrews transferred to the Academy as a Cadet Drill Instructor. One of his goals was to wipe out the word "stupid" from any class concerning patrol tactics and officer survival. It would not be hard to do. Some of the other staff members were also young, experienced, and ready to make changes. They knew, as he did, you could do everything right, yet still get killed before you knew what hit you.

When Deputy McAndrews arrived at the Academy, there was a change from the military model of training to a more approachable relationship between the staff and cadets (now called recruits). It was not quite stress versus non-stress, but it was pretty close. As a result, some of the senior staff members who had been assigned to the Academy before McAndrews' arrival were transferred. This allowed newer staff members to move into leadership positions much earlier than had been the case in the past.

The Academy staff wanted the training to reflect the conditions in the field. All of them had friends in patrol and at Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB) who they regularly contacted about tactical incidents. One of the most important contributors to the Academy's tactical curriculum was Deputy Dave Stothers from SEB. Dave and Mike McAndrews had been radio car partners at Firestone. Not only was Dave one of the best patrol deputies Mike had ever worked with, he also possessed excellent tactical skills. Dave and Mike were constantly going over different scenarios, updating lesson plans, and exchanging information.

An example of keeping the Academy training current occurred when Deputy Walt Pickering was shot at Firestone Station. Walt was a friend of Mike's and also his academy classmate. He and Mike were assigned to Firestone patrol in 1969. McAndrews transferred to the Academy while Pickering continued working patrol at Firestone. During an incident, Walt was wounded in a shooting and nearly died. During the gunfight, Walt killed the suspect. He spent months recovering before he was able to return to work.

While still recovering from his gunshot wound, Walt Pickering went to the academy and shared the circumstances surrounding his shooting with the academy staff. As McAndrews listened to Walt's story, he realized that Walt had the courage and self-discipline that every deputy should display. He was one of the bravest deputies McAndrews had ever known.

Captain Ken Cable, Lieutenant Charles Emerson, and Sergeant Ed Price were the academy staff who kept the officer survival training current with professional, dynamic, and timely training. Within days, Walt's story was part of the officer survival lesson plan.

Expanded Training

In 1970, SEB deputies were sent to Isla Visa to assist the Santa Barbara County Sheriff's Department with rioting occurring there. Some of the techniques used by the SEB deputies to deal with the rioters were not approved, and, because of this, almost all of the personnel assigned to SEB were transferred to other assignments. Among the new personnel transferred into SEB as replacements were Sergeants Dale Underwood and Larry Bodenstedt. They began working with Sergeant John Kolman, who remained at SEB, and expanded the officer survival training to include SEB and some of the techniques they practiced.

APSET Program

During the 1970s, when SEB deputies weren't training or on tactical callouts, they provided saturation patrol to patrol stations. The purpose of saturation patrol was to provide extra deputies to saturate an area while addressing crime problems such as burglaries or robberies. Because SEB deputies weren't always aware of the specific crime problems at each station, it sometimes created friction between the station deputies and SEB deputies. Also, SEB deputies would sometimes arrive at a call sooner than station deputies and begin handling it differently than the station deputies desired.

To create a better working relationship with the station deputies, SEB began a training program where SEB deputies and patrol deputies would work together. This program was called Advanced Patrol and Special Enforcement Training, better known as APSET. With this program, patrol sergeants and field training officers were placed on loan to SEB and trained with them daily. This not only provided station personnel with advanced tactical training, it fostered a better

working relationship between SEB and patrol deputies. APSET was later expanded to Disaster and Riot Training (DART).

In-Service Training

While Lieutenant Kolman and Sergeant Underwood were assigned to SEB, they taught tactics to recruits and in-service personnel. It was not unusual for Kolman or Underwood to show up at a station during all hours of the day or night and provide on-the-spot tactical training for patrol deputies. Not only were deputies going through the roleplaying, they were watching Kolman and Underwood's teaching methods. Kolman and Underwood never embarrassed a single deputy. Instead, they were helpful, encouraging, and supportive. Kolman and Underwood were always seeking information from deputies on possible threats and officer survival techniques.

Ambush Calls

During the 1970s, gang members were calling the police and making false calls to report crimes in progress. They then hid and observed how the police responded to different types of calls. This was done so they could set up to ambush the police at a future date. Eventually the Sheriff's Department created a radio code to make deputies aware of this type of incident. "Code 77" was the code that alerted patrol deputies that a call received at the station was suspicious and may be a possible ambush.

While working Lennox Station, Deputy McAndrews was approached by Deputy Ed Hunt who told him about an incident where he felt he and his partner were being set up for an ambush.

Ed was working a PM Vermont car when he and his partner received a call to a parking lot that turned out to be nothing. Ed felt that the location was perfect for an ambush. Something about this call didn't feel right. Both Ed and his partner felt they were being watched.

Deputies McAndrews and Hunt wrote up a memo on the incident and sent it to Lieutenant Kolman. Within a day, Kolman was on the phone thanking the deputies. A couple days later, McAndrews received a form from Kolman that laid out the information needed to describe a tactical incident. It was an excellent guide to identifying the pertinent facts surrounding a critical event and possible ambush.

Sharing the Officer Survival Message

John Kolman, Bob Kostka, and Carrol Hogue taught officer survival at the College of the Redwoods. At the time, this was of the few colleges teaching the subject. Deputy George Barthel also taught officer survival at the college. Years later, while investigating suspects attempting to conceal PCP at the Nickerson Gardens Housing Project, Deputy Barthel was killed by a man with a rifle who shot him and his partner from across the street.

In order to train the thousands of deputies throughout the Sheriff's Department on the most current tactics, Sergeant Carrol Hogue shared his knowledge on officer survival in articles he wrote and had published each month in the STAR News.

Deputy McAndrews began giving officer survival lectures to Academy recruit classes. Lieutenant Kolman and Sergeant Underwood heard about his classes and invited McAndrews to teach at various in-service training sessions. The three of them routinely discussed what was being taught in order to make sure there was consistency in all phases of officer survival training. McAndrews used Kolman and Underwood's lesson plan in every lecture he gave. McAndrews had a great talent for telling the stories of officers who fought for their lives. His emotional display thoroughly engaged the deputies listening to his articulate presentation of the facts. At the end of his presentations, McAndrews often received standing ovations.

The officer survival training movement that John Kolman and Dale Underwood started spread across the nation. Impromptu roleplaying sessions for one or two early morning patrol units evolved into station training days using movie sets at Universal Studios.

Training Films

Until the early 1980s, all law enforcement training programs were on 16mm film, and a projector was required to show them to academy cadets or in-service deputies.

Starting in 1970, a series of officer survival films was produced to train deputies. These films were recreations of actual officer survival incidents. The reserve deputies who provided technical expertise for these films worked full-time in the movie industry. Their experience in making major motion pictures allowed the Sheriff's Department to produce training films rivaling those produced by

companies specializing in law enforcement training. The technical expertise included directors, lighting directors, editors, and special effects crews. The special effects enhanced the training programs by making the shootings appear as they would in real life. The training films became so popular and the need so great that they were soon distributed to law enforcement agencies across the nation.

In the early 1970s, Deputies Bob Dixon, John Concialdi, and Doug Kruse, who worked for Sergeant Mike Hall at Sheriff's Information Bureau, were in charge of the group of reserves and volunteers who worked in the movie industry and produced public service announcements and crime awareness films. This group of deputies supervised the reserves as they produced the first officer survival film depicting a suspect who had robbed a store and was shot and killed by a deputy who confronted him. At the end of the film, the incident was repeated where the deputy used proper tactics and the suspect was taken into custody. They later produced the second officer survival film where a deputy was shot by a barricaded suspect.

After the success of the first two officer survival films, the deputies were transferred from Sheriff's Information Bureau to the Visual Aids Unit at Training Bureau. They then produced the third in the series of officer survival films which was a reenactment of the traffic stop where the four CHP officers were killed. The next in the series was a reenactment of a shooting where a suspect shot several citizens at Cerritos Mall, and when two detectives from Lakewood Station approached the house connected to the suspect's vehicle, they were gunned down.

MOU 48-Hour Training

In 1980, Duane Preimsberger, then captain of Training Bureau, assigned the Advanced Officer Training (AOT) Unit to take over the research of officer-involved shootings and teach officer survival training. AOT Lieutenant Ron Black supervised Deputies Pat "P.D." O'Mullen, Mark Milburn, John Martin, Ed Baker, and James "J.D." Harris in this endeavor.

That year, the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS) asked the Board of Supervisors for a large pay raise for deputies. All other county employee unions had already agreed to a lesser-percentage pay raise. In order to give deputies a higher raise than other county employees, the Board of Supervisors justified it by requiring all deputies to attend 48 hours of training. This was called MOU Training, which stood for Memorandum of Understanding. All sworn personnel from the rank of deputy to the rank of commander were required to

attend. AOT was responsible for scheduling and creating the training classes. Each of the AOT deputies took a segment of training and would lecture on that topic to 130 deputies. There was a wide variety of topics covered, including legal issues related to search and seizure, officer-involved shootings and related causal factors, and PR-24 baton training. The training was conducted over four 12-hour days.

Deputies Mike McAndrews, Mark Milburn, and J.D. Harris taught officer survival. P.D. O'Mullen taught familiarity with equipment and lectured on drawing the weapon from the holster and reloading drills. John Martin taught the PR-24 baton. Since Deputy Martin was a karate expert and competed nationally, his experience and knowledge were displayed during his presentations, making his classes widely accepted. Cathy Taylor filled in when John Martin wasn't available to teach. Striking bags were set up in the gym for students to practice their baton strikes. Each instructor would train 20 students at a time, taking them through a variety of skills. Each student learned through hands-on experience. Lieutenant Callanan taught classes on search and seizure.

Most of the sworn personnel were initially upset they had to attend this training to receive their pay raise. But once they attended, everyone was enthusiastic about what it taught them.

Reenactments

Up to that time, training on officer-involved shootings involved only an instructor drawing a diagram on a chalkboard of what occurred. The AOT Staff wanted deputies to have a more accurate understanding of what transpired during these shootings. After the lecture, students looked on as AOT deputies conducted reenactments of actual incidents.

The MOU training on officer survival allowed the students to view a shooting reenactment using real people doing the exact same things that occurred during the actual incident. The reenactments were as accurate as possible, including the actions of the suspects and the deputies during the encounter. The deputies watching understood more clearly what had taken place. The first reenactment they roleplayed was the George Arthur and Mike Waters shooting.

Shoot – Don't Shoot Training

A law enforcement training film titled "Shoot Don't Shoot" was produced by Motorola Teleprograms Inc. and broadcast on national television in 1982. The film documented average citizens from a variety of occupations as they were placed in the role of a police officer and put in realistic situations. In each situation presented, they had to react as a police officer would. Prior to going through the scenarios, many of the citizens who appeared in the film were critical of law enforcement, accusing them of using too much force and firing their weapons too often. Virtually everyone who went through this training changed their opinions 180 degrees from when they started. They now had a much better understanding of why the officers did what they did, the situations they faced, and the decisions they had to make.

Shooting Box

Lieutenant Kolman realized deputies needed training to learn how to react to shoot or don't-shoot situations. Because of this, he designed and created a large wooden shooting box that was placed in the East LA Station briefing room. The wooden box held a large roll of butcher paper held in place across the front of the box. A slide projector was used to project single photo slides in sequence to show incidents where deputies needed to make decisions on whether to shoot or don't shoot. Deputies' revolvers were unloaded and then reloaded with rounds that fired a wax projectile. The projectiles would pierce the paper. With the slide still projected on the paper, the shooters could see exactly where their round struck. The wooden box was designed to stop and capture the wax projectiles. When these rounds were used in the deputies' revolvers, it was necessary to clean their guns right away. If they didn't, black powder formed inside the gun's barrel and caused pits to form. The slides for the shooting box were photographed by Lieutenant Kolman and Deputy Lee Lanzini.

Wooden shooting boxes were eventually built by the mechanical department and delivered to all patrol stations so they could conduct their own officer survival training.

Survival Tactics for Non-Uniformed Personnel

In the late 1960s, deputies working undercover received no formal training on conducting surveillances. Instead, Deputy Joe Berger and other deputies working Vice learned from experienced detectives who had been conducting surveillances for years. Improving their skills through practice and trial and error, they became proficient in single-man and two-man surveillances. Since there were no portable

radios or cell phones, they relied on hand signals to communicate with each other. In 1970, Deputy Berger transferred to Headquarters Burglary-Major Violators Crew where he developed training on identification, vehicle surveillance, close surveillance, foot surveillance, entry tactics, and set-up for an arrest using unmarked vehicles.

In 1975, Deputy Berger transferred to Training Bureau where he was in charge of creating training classes on a variety of subjects for detectives. Since detectives and undercover deputies weren't readily identified as law enforcement officers, their tactics and survival training had to be different from uniformed personnel. One of the classes he developed was titled, "Officer Survival Training for Non-Uniformed Deputies." During the class, detectives learned tactics to keep them safe while involved in surveillances, forcing entry into a building, or making vehicle stops and arrests using unmarked vehicles. They also learned how to blend in while on foot or driving a vehicle.

This training was successful in providing the Sheriff's Department's Regional Burglary Surveillance Units with the officer survival knowledge and tactics necessary to keep them safe. DEA agents who encountered the same safety issues heard about the officer survival training and asked if their agents could attend. After completing the training, the deputies and agents went into their undercover operations far better prepared.

Weapon Retention

Corrections officers working in prison guard towers throughout the country filmed inmates in prison yards practicing weapon takeaway techniques. One inmate would tuck a stick in his waistband on his side as though it was an officer's gun, while the other inmate positioned himself in the wall prop position. As the first inmate searched the other inmate, the inmate on the wall would grab the simulated officer's gun hand. He would then reach his other hand around and remove the stick as if taking a gun from its holster.

After obtaining this information, AOT deputies began teaching weapon retention techniques using the deputies' breakfront holsters. J.D. Harris explained to deputies in his class how they could prevent a suspect from taking their revolver by pushing down on the revolver's handle and turning it into the suspect. This was a life-and-death situation, because if the suspect obtained the deputy's weapon, he was most likely going to kill the deputy with it. He also taught deputies how to take a weapon away from a suspect.

Expanded Training

When Deputy Chris Miller transferred into the Visual Aids Unit in 1982, he realized it would be impossible for Deputy J.D. Harris to train the thousands of deputies on the Department in these critical techniques by himself. Miller knew that all the deputies could be trained in a shorter period of time using training films. Miller paired up with Harris to make training films on some of the lessons Harris was teaching. The first training film produced by Miller was on weapon retention and takeaway. Starring J.D. Harris and narrated by Casey Kasem, a popular DJ at the time, it was shot and edited on 16mm film by Reserve Deputy Ralph White. This film, along with others produced by Miller and Harris, were shown throughout the Department to expand the deputies' officer survival knowledge and expertise.

Officer Stabbing (Officer Survival 5)

Miller and Harris decided to produce a fifth officer survival training film. The four previous ones in the series involved officers who were killed by guns. Harris decided that the next officer survival film should involve the dangers of a suspect with a knife. Harris and Miller decided on reenacting the September 30, 1979, death of Harbor Patrol Officer Harold Edgington in Marina del Rey. Edgington was attacked by a suspect who cut his throat and chest open.

While talking to deputies about prior officer survival films, Harris and Miller learned that those who'd seen Officer Survival 3, the training film about the four CHP officers killed during a traffic stop, had the impression from the way gunshot victims were depicted that when they shot a suspect, big chunks of flesh would fly off. That's what was portrayed in the film reenacting the shooting. That was one of the negative aspects of using special effects experts from the movie industry who were used to dramatizing real situations. These reserve deputies from the movie industry were used to creating sensationalized shootings, not shootings that necessarily demonstrated reality. In real shootings, there would be very little visual damage where the bullet entered. Because of this, many deputies involved in actual shootings felt like they didn't hit the suspect. They were expecting the bullet to cause massive damage and the suspect to go down immediately. When that didn't happen, it affected their self-confidence. Harris and Miller decided to make the films as realistic as possible, showing what really happens when a suspect was shot.

In 1983, Deputy Dave Fender transferred to the Visual Aids Unit and assisted Deputy Miller with the production of Officer Survival 5 and 6. This involved

supervising more than 100 reserve deputies and civilian volunteers in the production and post-production of each training film. The Officer Survival films were filmed on 35mm film using the same camera, lighting and grip equipment used by professional movie crews. Miller and Fender were responsible for picking up and supervising the use of the professional film equipment. They also supervised the editing which was done at major movie studios by professional editors who were reserve deputies for the sheriff's department.

Once Officer Survival 5 was complete and distributed, Harris and Miller decided to work on the next one. Foot pursuits had always been dangerous, so they decided this would be the subject of Officer Survival 6.

Foot Pursuits – The Point of No Return (Officer Survival 6)

On April 18, 1978, Deputy Thomas Pohlman was killed while chasing a suspect from a PCP lab. Deputy Miller had worked Central Jail with Pohlman and remembered how excited Pohlman was when he was told he was transferring to East LA Station. He also remembered, a year later, hearing over the radio in the Compton Court lockup that Pohlman had been killed with his own weapon. Miller told Harris he didn't want Pohlman to die in vain, so he wanted the next film in the series to reenact Pohlman's shooting. Miller titled Officer Survival 6, "Foot Pursuits – The Point of No Return."

Foot pursuits are very dangerous because deputies never know what is awaiting them around the corner. This film trained deputies on what actions suspects were likely to take when running from deputies.

The Will to Survive (Office Survival 7)

After completion of the foot pursuit training film, Deputy Fender transferred from the Media Resource Unit (formerly the Visual Aids Unit) and was replaced by Deputy Maria (Clem) Myron. She picked up where he left off by working with Deputy Miller in the production of Officer Survival 7 and 8. Miller and Clem had their work cut out for them because both of these training films were shot at night. In addition to all of the other filming equipment, these films required the use of multiple lights and generators.

Officer Survival 7, titled "The Will to Survive," was the next training film that Harris and Miller produced. This film was a reenactment of the Arthur and Waters shooting. George Arthur and Mike Waters confronted three suspects and were

attacked. Both of them were pistol-whipped. Waters was shot in the face. During the attack, both deputies reflected back to an officer survival lecture that Lieutenant John Kolman had presented on not giving up and fighting back. After remembering Kolman's lecture, both Arthur and Waters fought back and killed the suspects. The day of the filming of this scene, Kolman was out of town, so Lieutenant Mike McAndrews filled in for him.

"Pain is No Barometer to How Bad You are Hurt"

One of the most dramatic statements delivered by McAndrews in "The Will to Survive" training film was, "Pain is no barometer to how bad you are hurt."

McAndrews came up with this statement after researching the December 8, 1970, Wallace/Campbell shooting. During a traffic stop, Deputy Al Campbell conducted a pat-down search of a suspect. The suspect pulled a gun from his waistband. While Campbell was fighting for control of the gun, the suspect pulled the trigger, striking Campbell in the hand and knee. The bullets shattered bones in both his hand and leg. Deputy Wallace was trying to get a shot at the suspect as he stood over the suspect and Campbell as they struggled for control of the weapon. He couldn't get a clear shot since Campbell was blocking his view of the suspect. Eventually, as the barrel was pointed at Wallace's chest, the suspect was able to pull the trigger. Though mortally wounded, Wallace was able to shoot and kill the suspect and then put out a call for help.

Even though he was dying, Wallace did not appear to be in a great deal of pain. On the other hand, Campbell's wounds were not life-threatening, but he was in excruciating pain. McAndrews decided deputies needed to understand that pain from their injuries was not necessarily an indicator of how serious their injuries were. That's when he came up with the saying, "Pain is no barometer to how bad you are hurt." He followed that with, "I don't care how bad you're hurt, you get up off the ground and continue to fight. But you never give up, never give up! Never, while you're out there, give up!"

Off-Duty Survival

On September 5, 1984, while off duty, LASD Deputy David Holguin was shot and killed as he assisted a young child who was alone at a bus stop. After this occurred, Deputies Harris and Miller thought the Department should produce a

training film on off-duty survival since there was a lack of training on this subject. This "Off Duty Survival" training film included a reenactment of the Holguin Shooting and also a reenact the off-duty incident where, on November 17, 1979, LASD Reserve Deputy Jerry Slagle's three-year-old daughter was killed when he confronted two suspects as they exited a supermarket they had just robbed. In this film, deputies where shown all the equipment and assistance available to them when on duty that wasn't available when off duty.

Emergency Driving – The Fatal Mistakes (Officer Survival 8)

In the 1980s, just as many deputies were killed in traffic collisions as they were from gunshots. Because of this, the Officer Survival 8 film was going to reenact crashes where deputies were killed. This film was actually three films in one. There were three separate stories, each with their own crash. One crash was a radio car rollover, the second, a radio car crashing into a civilian vehicle, and the third, two radio cars that collided in Antelope Valley, killing both a deputy and a reserve deputy.

This training film was the largest ever produced by the Media Resource Unit. Deputies Miller and Myron worked with professional stunt coordinator Hal Needham who directed major motion pictures such as Smokey and the Bandit and Cannonball Run. They also hired a professional stunt driver to drive the cars as they were crashed in three separate incidents. Another filming nightmare involved the staging of a pursuit involving 30 radio cars. Deputy Myron was instrumental in coordinating the radio cars in the pursuit as well as the safety of all of the drivers and vehicles.

This was the last officer survival film shot in 35mm. Once it was completely shot, Miller could not find an editor at any of the major film studios to edit it. It was a 45-minute film; three 15-minute films in one. The previous films were only 15 minutes long. Many changes took place over the years that were revealed in the film. The radio cars and uniform name tags were outdated. The Media Resource Unit was just beginning to produce training programs on videotape, which were done in a fraction of the time it took to produce training films on 16mm and 35mm film. This caused Sergeant Mark Aguirre, who supervised the Media Resource Unit, to order Miller to cancel the film. This was disappointing to Miller since he had worked so hard for two years while filming one of the largest training films in his career.

Career Survival

Duane Preimsberger, who was the division chief responsible for the Training Bureau, recognized the Department was losing more deputies through termination than those killed in the line of duty. He told Deputy Miller that he wanted an officer survival training film produced addressing career survival. This was to be the first officer survival training program to be shot on videotape. A script was written and approved. When Miller started producing it, a problem came up. One of the scenes would show a K9 deputy searching a jewelry store while a surveillance camera would capture him stealing jewelry. When Miller told the deputy what he was going to do, the deputy said, "I don't do that, and I'm not going to." Miller stopped taping and talked to Chief Preimsberger. They discussed shooting the video using generic uniforms, not LASD uniforms, and using actors instead of actual deputies. A solution to the problem could not be decided on, so the training video was cancelled.

After the emergency driving film and career survival video were cancelled, the series of officer survival training programs was put on hold.

Laser Training Discovered

While Duane Preimsberger was the captain of Training Bureau, he was told to come up with training alternatives that would address some of the causes of controversial shootings that had occurred. He realized the Weapons Training Unit was teaching deputies how to gain target acquisition, but was not developing decision-making training that would teach deputies how to better decide when to shoot or not shoot.

One Sunday, while Preimsberger was lying in a floating lounge in his pool and reading the L.A. Times, he read about a laser training system used by the U.S. military that was also being used in the nuclear transportation field. This group of people moved nuclear weapons all around the United States in semi-trucks and trailers. In order to train their personnel, they used laser weapons that fired laser beams at laser-sensitive clothing to detect when a person was hit. Preimsberger thought this training system was fascinating and wondered if they would let him see it. He called the person in charge of the MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) and asked if they could demonstrate it for the Sheriff's Department. The company who developed the system saw the potential in having the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department adopt the system. The credibility of the Sheriff's Department and its state-of-the-art training had a great influence on many other law enforcement agencies. The MILES developer knew that if the Los

Angeles County Sheriff's Department adopted their system, word would spread across the nation and every police agency in the country would want one. The company decided to fly to California to demonstrate the system for Preimsberger, the Advanced Officer Training staff, and other divisions within the Sheriff's Department.

Evaluating the System

Members of the Department's Advanced Officer Training staff, as well as other training personnel from throughout the Department, viewed the demonstration on how the MILES system operated. They were very impressed by the system and its capabilities, and they wanted to obtain it for the Department. In order to implement the new laser equipment, structures capable of supporting it would need to be built. Preimsberger knew the Department could save a lot of money building a village of connected buildings by using the Department's contacts in the construction industry. They would also need to purchase laser weapons and laser-sensitive clothing to detect laser strikes. All of this could be done for about $300,000. In those days, that was a lot of money, so when Preimsberger requested that amount to build Laser Village and purchase laser weapons and vests, he was told the Department didn't have the funds available to support the project.

Funding the Project

Preimsberger realized the importance of the shooting system, so he went out searching for a way to fund the project. He located a reserve deputy by the name of Ken Norris who owned Norris Industries. Norris was very supportive of law enforcement, so Preimsberger arranged for a MILES representative to travel to California to demonstrate the system. He invited Norris to attend the presentation, along with Department executives. The executives thought it was a great idea and suggested he invite Sheriff Peter Pitchess to attend as well.

The day of the demonstration, Norris showed up early, but unfortunately, Sheriff Pitchess was more than an hour late. Preimsberger talked the entire time, trying his best to keep the company representative and Norris distracted. Finally, Norris told Preimsberger, "I have things to do, I can't wait around," adding, "The Sheriff's late, can't you just show me the system?" Preimsberger was in a dilemma. If he waited for the Sheriff to arrive, he risked the possibility of losing the money to fund the system. If he had the system demonstrated for Norris alone, he risked the possibility the Sheriff would be upset with him. Not wanting to risk

the money, Preimsberger told the representative to demonstrate the system for Norris.

Norris was not only showed the system, he was allowed to shoot a laser weapon, wear a laser vest, and be shot with a laser weapon. When the demonstration was over, Norris was absolutely enthralled. He asked Preimsberger, "How much do you guys need to do this?" Preimsberger told him, "We think it's in the ballpark of $300,000, but it may be less." Norris responded, "Okay, you've got the money!" He then said, "I've got to get going, I'll see you later." A short time later, Sheriff Pitchess arrived with his entourage. When he walked in, he asked Preimsberger, "Where's Norris?" Preimsberger told him that Norris had just left. The Sheriff seemed shocked, exclaiming, "He just left?" Preimsberger replied, "Yeah, he couldn't wait for you. He said he was sorry he missed you and to give you his best. He's gone!" Pitchess asked, "Well, what the hell happened?" Preimsberger responded, "He gave me $300,000," to which Pitchess replied, "Oh."

The Laser Training System

The LASD Laser System originated with MILES, but was personalized for the Sheriff's Department by Jaycor, Inc. in San Diego. This system was developed for law enforcement to train deputies to confront suspects in close-range situations that develop quickly. The MILES system utilized laser devices attached to the exterior of the weapon. The WESS system (Weapons Engagement Simulation System), developed by Jaycor, was more advanced, with laser optics incorporated directly into the barrel of the weapon.

The MILES and Jaycor vests were also different in how they detected hits and misses by the laser beams projected from the deputies' revolvers. The MILES system differentiated between near misses, non-fatal hits, and fatal hits, while the Jaycor system only indicated a hit or a miss. The MILES system was designed for wide-area military battle conditions, where the Jaycor system was designed for close-up confrontations.

Building the Village

Funding for Laser Village didn't cost the taxpayers any money at all. The half-million-dollar complex, along with the required laser equipment, was entirely funded by the private sector. Reserve Deputy Ken Norris was an industrialist who paid for all the laser equipment and materials to build the village. The construction was completed at no cost by the Carpenters Joint Apprenticeship and Training

Fund for Southern California, California Carpenters Local 1506, the Joint Apprenticeship Committee, and LASD reserve deputies. Exterior lighting fixtures were donated and installed by Southern California Edison. Furniture used to furnish the house, bank, gun shop, and real estate office was donated by local businesses.

LASD Laser Village

The Laser Village facility was built at Biscailuz Center on the grounds of the Sheriff's Training Academy. It consisted of a small house and a two-story commercial building. The commercial building contained a bank, real estate office, and gun shop on the first floor, with various commercial offices on the second floor. There were interior stairs and exterior stairs with a balcony. A third one-story building contained a liquor store and bar with a flat roof to be used by SEB for rappelling purposes. The bar and liquor store were connected via a hallway at the back of the building. There was also a restroom in the bar and another in the liquor store. All the buildings were completed inside and out with electricity to power lights, light switches, and electrical outlets. The rooms were decorated with authentic furniture and wall art to make them appear as actual businesses.

The Weapons

The electronic components were concealed inside the grips of the Smith & Wesson K-frame .38 caliber, 4-inch revolver, which all deputies carried at the time. The optics component that projected the laser beam was hidden inside the barrel of the revolver. The laser beam itself was activated mechanically when a deputy pulled the trigger. There was no recoil when the weapon was fired. An insert in the cylinder prevented live rounds from being loaded.

Also modified was the Ithaca 12-gauge shotgun with an 18-inch barrel. This shotgun was identical to the one carried by deputies in the field at the time. On the shotgun, the electronics were concentrated inside the barrel, so when the flash went off, the shell's primer would trigger the laser beam to fire.

The laser beam from both the revolver and shotgun reached a distance of 60 feet. The revolver's beam traveled in a direct line to its target. The beam from the shotgun sprayed out so its spread was similar to No. 4 Buckshot. The rounds used for the shotgun were empty blank cases with a primer. Full-power blank rounds could not be used in the shotgun, since they would damage the delicate optics in

the barrel. When a round was fired from a laser shotgun, the discharge primer exploding vented to the side just before the chamber.

Instead of using the metallic shotgun round case, a case made of plastic specifically designed for the primer-only round was used. When a round was fired from a laser weapon, the plastic casing of the round caused a louder report than the metallic casing. The plastic shotgun round used by the Sheriff's Department was called a Speer plastic case. It provided the loudest sound, especially in a confined area where the firing of shotgun rounds would cause deputies' ears to ring.

The Sheriff's Department purchased 35 revolvers and 4 shotguns with laser capability. Eventually, they purchased automatic weapons that fired laser beams to be used in SWAT-type operations.

The Laser Vest

The second half of the laser system involved a vest worn by all participants in the scenario. This vest would detect a direct hit from a laser beam fired from one of the weapons. The vest was the same size as ballistic vests worn by most officers. Under the surface of the vest were 35 sensors in the front and 35 sensors in the back, all set in a random pattern. The front and back panels of the vests were divided into 3 vertical zones, allowing the shooter to see if his aim was to the left, to the right, or dead center. Each zone had a red indicator light that would flash when a laser beam struck in that vertical area. This simulated a bullet hit. A momentary chirping would also occur when a vest detected a laser beam strike. This allowed the person wearing the vest, as well as the instructor, to know he had been hit. The audible beep was reset after a few seconds to allow the vest to detect additional hits. The blinking light would continue blinking until it was reset by the instructor using a magnetic key card. The vests were worn by deputies, suspects, and innocent bystanders who were involved in the scenario. The bystanders were placed nearby, so if a deputy's rounds went astray, the instructor would know it.

Laser Village Training Begins

The AOT staff that operated Laser Village when it first opened in January 1983 consisted of Lieutenant Ron Black, Sergeant Jerry Skaggs, and Deputies P.D. O'Mullen, Larry Rupp, Harry Marco, Bob Binkley, and J. D. Harris. They taught deputies officer survival tactics and observed deputies as they handled various scenarios during their training.

At that time, AOT was divided into two sections; one operated Laser Village and taught officer survival training, while the second scheduled the training classes.

The staff that scheduled the training classes and acted as role players at Laser Village were Sergeant Patty Norris and Deputies Bob Livingston, Roger Zombek, Sonja Wilson, and Val Burwell.

Classroom Lectures

The classroom that was located under the Biscailuz Center Range was used as the Laser Village classroom. The classes began with lectures to explain the basic skills deputies needed to handle situations they would be encountering that day. Since many deputies had poor habits when drawing their weapons, it was necessary to retrain them. They were taught how to break bad habits and how to properly draw their weapons from their holsters. An officer survival training film was shown and the tactics were discussed. After that, the AOT staff issued deputies their laser weapons that would be used during the Laser Village training.

Laser Village training focused on: Planning, Communication, Splitting of Partners, Familiarity with Equipment, and Tactics. These areas were identified as the cornerstone of officer survival training after hundreds of officer-involved shootings throughout the United States were researched by Deputies John Kolman, Dale Underwood, and LAPD Officer Bob Smitson.

The purpose of Laser Village training was to teach deputies how to survive life-or-death situations. The questions the Laser Village staff asked each class were: Have you ever thought about or planned for a situation that might occur to you as a deputy? Have you ever communicated your ideas to other deputies who work with you in the same car or on the same shift? Have you ever run off into the darkness by yourself after a suspect who quite possibly knows the area better than you? Have you ever had difficulty drawing your weapon from its holster in a stressful situation? Can you fire and hit a target that's moving and firing back at you? Are you tactically sound in your approach to any number of situations common to this occupation?

In the Village

Once they moved out of the classroom and into the village, deputies were taught basic skills such as serving warrants, building searches, and handling routine calls. Scenarios that deputies handled included responding to a domestic violence call at

the house, a robbery at the liquor store, and a burglary at the gun shop. It could be more advanced, with multiple radio cars responding to a call, or SEB responding to a hostage situation at one of the businesses. SEB could also rappel onto the top of the building and respond to a threat inside. With the ability of the radio cars to drive right up to the building, deputies could handle the calls from arrival to completion.

Deputies moved through the building without knowing what would occur or who might appear in front of them. This training tested their reflex reactions to a threat, as well as their ability to draw their weapons and hit an active target. Some of the scenarios were shoot situations and some were not. Whether shoot or don't shoot, each situation created tension.

Actual crimes or incidents deputies had been involved in were used by the Laser Village staff to create scenarios where deputies would be placed in situations that would test their reactions, ability to use their equipment, and skill in striking a target in an area that would incapacitate the attacker. The training was so realistic that, at times, when deputies were searching a building and were completely surprised by a suspect, they peed their pants.

The Laser Village staff taught deputies that when faced with an unsafe one-on-one confrontation with a suspect, they should consider immediately moving to cover, calling for assistance on the radio, and containing the location, instead of standing in place and confronting the suspect like in an old western movie.

Deputies were taught that if they were struck by gunfire, they should continue and never give up. They needed to return gunfire and move to cover. They were also taught that just because a suspect is shot doesn't mean the suspect will stop attacking or shooting at you.

A debriefing was held after each training session where instructors explained what the deputies did correctly and what they needed to improve on. It was this debriefing where deputies learned survival skills that could save their lives on the street.

Laser Village allowed deputies to explore and evaluate their abilities and limitations in an environment as realistic as could possibly be created at the time. Some deputies learned from their experience and practiced to overcome their shortcomings.

Laser Village training was far more effective than classroom lectures since it involved deputies being placed in real-life situations and reacting to real-life suspects. The hours spent in the classroom listening to officer survival lectures and watching training films, as well as range practice and going through Hogan's Alley, just couldn't compare to confronting actual suspects in realistic scenarios.

In 1984, the Sheriff's Academy and AOT were moved from Biscailuz Center in East LA to the STARS Center in Whittier. Since Laser Village was physically located at Biscailuz Center and could not be moved, the AOT staff that trained deputies there were reassigned from AOT to Laser Village. They remained at Biscailuz Center, under the supervision of the Weapons Training Unit.

How Laser Training Changed Tactics

Prior to the development of Laser Village training, deputies qualified monthly by standing facing their target with their guns out of their holster. They fired at a stationary target from 25 yards away. When Laser Village training first started, the instructors noticed that deputies couldn't get their guns out of their holsters in stressful situations, and when they did, they attempted to line up their sites on the suspect who was only 6 to 8 feet away.
The greatest learning point deputies took from Laser Village was they needed to practice how to quickly and smoothly draw their revolver from their holster, especially in stressful situations. The other important lesson they learned was when they were close to a suspect, they didn't need to line up their sights; they just needed to point and shoot.

When deputies initially went through the scenarios, they would handle their guns the same way that popular actors were handling them on TV or in the movies. The Laser Village staff had to show deputies how to properly handle their weapons.

Another lesson the deputies learned was that as they returned fire, they needed to move to cover. When they didn't, they ended up with all three lights on the front of the vest lighting up, indicating they had been shot multiple times.

The Laser Village training didn't teach deputies to always shoot in every situation they encountered. There were non-shoot situations as well, so deputies could learn to use discretion and, if necessary, back out and contain the situation if safer to do so.

Change from Revolvers to Autoloaders

On January 14, 1987, Deputies Michael Claus and Brant Tunget were involved in a pursuit and shooting with a suspect who fired a MAC-10 at them. An in-depth critique of the shooting and the tactics employed by the deputies revealed a need for more realistic "combat shoot" training and was a major catalyst for the Sheriff's Department changing from revolvers to semi-automatics. In 1988, the Beretta 9mm semi-automatic pistol became the official sidearm carried by deputies. The conversion to semi-automatic pistols from revolvers began in 1989 and took several years to complete for the more than 9,000 deputies.

While the transition to Berettas was taking place, laser revolvers initially purchased and used for training were still being used at Laser Village. In order for deputies who had been issued Berettas to use the same weapons in training that they carried in the field, laser Beretta pistols were purchased in the early 1990s. During this same time period, the Laser Village staff began to integrate the U.S. Military MILES gear into some of their training. This was done to emulate the emerging threat of high-powered weaponry that gang members were using. This equipment was borrowed from Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton.

Realistic Training

Whether true or not, deputies complained that in the past, every situation they encountered in Laser Village training was designed for them to lose. The Laser Village staff who arrived in the early 1990s were Sergeant Mike Janovich and Deputies Mike Reynolds, Chris Branuelas, Derek Sill, Ed Bunton, Jon Rhodes, Roy Burns, Gary LeBeau, Mary Michel and Bechamp Hyde. They wanted deputies to realize they could survive even bad situations by thinking on their feet, having good reactions, and using proper tactics. These instructors wanted to make every scenario winnable for the deputies. They knew that every student who went through the training made mistakes. They didn’t want the deputies to feel as though they were being constantly criticized. Instead of criticizing them, they had the deputies go through each scenario a second time. This built up their confidence by allowing them to handle it correctly using the knowledge they had gained from their previous mistakes.

This type of training was implemented based on a study involving Air Force pilots involved in combat air fights in Vietnam where it was discovered that a pilot who survived one air fight was likely to survive others. They realized that having undergone a life-and-death struggle in a realistic situation allowed the deputies to

experience the reality of what they would encounter rather than what they thought it would be like. They were more likely to survive because now their reactions were faster and they were relying on real-life experience rather than something taught in a classroom.

The instructors wanted Laser Village training to be as realistic as possible and that meant creating the stress of a dangerous situation, including the same sounds and lighting that would be encountered during an actual shooting. The instructors felt the training the students were receiving was so realistic that it would give them the confidence they needed to rely on during an actual shooting.

This group of instructors wanted to make the training specific to what deputies would encounter in the field, so they created their own scenarios and training course. They realized that the level of reality was crucial to the effectiveness of the class. They had student deputies run 50 yards, simulating a foot pursuit; strike a bag with their baton, simulating an altercation with a suspect; and then enter the shooting trailer and became involved in an officer-involved shooting.

They would also come up with tactics to handle situations deputies encountered in the field during actual shootings. Some of the situations they designed involved tactics to handle encounters with pedestrians, suspects on bicycles, and rescuing a deputy who was down.

Classes were added for detectives on serving warrants, building approach, safely moving through buildings, and handling situations they were more likely to be involved in.

They also created training designed specifically for tactical teams, teaching them to work as a team and practice team movement. The teams that attended this training included deputies from Narcotics Bureau and SWAT teams from outside police agencies.

At that time, all Laser Village training was done during the day, although many shootings occurred at night. Because of this, the Laser Village staff decided to start conducting night training. What they observed were deputies attempting to handle their flashlights at the same time they were firing their weapons.

Another issue the staff dealt with involved deputies who had been shot reacting the same as actors in the movies or on TV. This meant that just one shot would incapacitate them, and they would fall down and die. The instructors had to convince deputies that real life does not happen that way. If deputies continue to

fight, run, shoot, and do whatever is necessary to stay alive, most of them would survive their encounter, even if they were shot severely or multiple times.

The instructors had made the training more realistic and effective, but there was still something missing. When the laser weapons were fired, there was no recoil or loud bang that you would experience with an actual duty weapon. Another issue preventing the training from being realistic was that when a deputy was struck by gunfire, the laser vest made a beeping sound with a flashing light, but the deputy would not feel the round striking them as they would in a real situation.

Citizen Academies

In the 1990s, the Sheriff's Department starting conducting Citizen Academies, where citizens were taught about law enforcement and why deputies react as they do. The citizens went through Laser Village training so they could better understand what is was like to be a law enforcement officer in dangerous situations. After the classroom training, they were placed in the shooting simulator where they faced armed suspects and had to make shooting decisions. Many of them overreacted, shooting innocent victims.

Notable Citizens are Put on the Spot

The Laser Village Training staff loved to have activists, news reporters, judges, attorneys, mayors, and city council members go through Laser Village training. Prior to the training, many of these notable citizens were biased against law enforcement and the actions deputies took on a daily basis. Many of their perceptions about law enforcement were based on what they had seen in the media.

During the training, when these notables were confronted with suspects who were noncompliant, most of them overreacted by taking actions way outside what the law allowed law enforcement officers to do. They reacted with excessive and sometimes deadly force when dealing with unarmed suspects. This training opened the eyes of many who were initially skeptical, but now understood what deputies faced on a daily basis and how much self-restraint was required when dealing with suspects not complying with their orders.

Live Fire House

The Laser Village staff learned of a process the Army Corps of Engineers had developed where they used a mixture of cement containing air bubbles to build the walls of a shooting house. The air bubbles in the cement caused the bullets fired at

them to be absorbed into the wall rather than ricochet. The staff built small walls out of wood and other items that deputies used for cover during live fire training. This training was unique because deputies used live rounds to fire at cardboard targets inside this specially designed building. The rounds would be absorbed into the walls and not go outside the building. A viewing platform on the back side of the building overlooked the ceiling-less rooms below. The back wall where the instructors observed the shooters was painted red so the students would know not to point their guns in that direction.

Using Cover

One of the problems that the Laser Village Staff noticed was that deputies in patrol were using their car doors for cover. The car doors would not stop many bullets, and they wanted deputies to know that. Deputy Bunton came up with the idea to obtain two radio car doors and shoot them with a variety of bullet rounds to indicate which bullet rounds would penetrate the doors. Deputy Bunton obtained two marked radio car doors and Branuelas took them to the range. He fired a variety of weapons at the doors. After each shot, he marked the bullet hole in the door with the type of gun used. Once he was done, the doors were hung in the Laser Village classroom for deputies to see for themselves the types of bullets that would penetrate the radio car doors they were using for cover.

Training Videos

Branuelas was chosen, to represent the Laser Village Staff, as the technical advisor for numerous training videos that were produced for Laser Village. The Laser Village Staff wanted deputies to know what items, besides their car doors, could be used for cover and what items could be used for concealment. Deputy Branuelas asked Chris Miller at the Media Resource Unit to make a training video on using cover and concealment. Miller wrote a script and Don Morea videotaped the shooting tests. Over several days, Branuelas fired rounds from different types of weapons into and through objects that deputies commonly used for cover. These included a fire hydrant, telephone pole, trash dumpster, block wall, brick wall, radio car doors, and many other items. He wanted deputies to understand what was cover and what was concealment and what types of rounds each would stop or not stop. Once the taping was complete, Larry Fisher edited the footage together. This training video was used by law enforcement agencies all around the country.

Encountering Deadly Force Decisions

Another video produced for Laser Village by the Media Resource Unit was "Encountering Deadly Force Decisions." Some deputies who were involved in shootings incorrectly believed they were incapacitated or were going to die after being shot with just one or two rounds in non-vital parts of their body. This myth was perpetuated by shootings they had seen on TV shows or in the latest action movies. To dispel this myth, a doctor appearing in the video explained how long a person could keep functioning and sometimes survive even when shot in vital parts of the body. This helped deputies understand that if they were shot, where they were shot had a big influence on their survivability and ability to continue fighting back. It also helped them understand why a suspect could continue fighting or continue to shoot when shot in a vital area.

Shooting Through Windshields

The Laser Village Staff noticed that deputies often sat inside their radio cars during containments. They wanted deputies to know that the only part of the radio car that would protect them was the engine block. Bullets would penetrate all other parts of the vehicle. Another concern with deputies sitting inside their radio cars was that bullets that struck the windows or windshield would cause a spray of glass fragments that could hit the deputies' eyes, blinding them. Some deputies who were involved in shootings had this happen to them. In addition, their own bullets deflected when they fired back through the windshield, causing their target to be missed, so it was equally important deputies understood the danger that existed in shooting at suspects through their windshield.

Deputy Miller was contacted by Branuelas to make a training video highlighting these points. The video was called "Shooting Through Windshields" and included interviews with deputies who were involved in shootings where a suspect fired at them through their windshield or where they fired at a suspect through their windshield.

Urban Sniper Situations

During the 1992 riots, there were rumors that gang members were going to use long rifles to fire at law enforcement officers. Because of this, the Laser Village staff contacted the Media Resource Unit to produce a training video on urban sniper situations. The video was written and shot by Chris Miller and edited by Fisher within one week. Rich Teeman was responsible for finding locations to film the video as well as actors to appear in it. The video was distributed to

deputies to view throughout the Department. It taught them how to identify where a suspect with a rifle was firing from and how to confront a sniper in that situation.

Warrant Service and Building Search Techniques

Another video created for the Laser Village staff was "Warrant Service and Building Search Techniques." This video taught deputies how to approach a building during a warrant service and how to move through rooms and enter through doorways. It also taught different techniques such as "slicing the pie" and "blading."

Straight Talk

The educational possibilities of the TV shows COPS and Wildest Police Videos caught the attention of law enforcement, so the Video Production Unit obtained TiVo digital video recorders to record the programs. Deputies from the Force Training Unit and Recruit Training Unit would stop by and view the videos, looking for those that might be helpful in their classes.

Video Production Specialist Gerardo Mendoza noticed that while watching the shows, the deputies would be quick to critique the actions of the officers. Mendoza suggested that a program called "Straight Talk" be produced using an episode from COPS. As the viewer watched the original footage, a deputy from the Force Training Unit would appear in the top corner of the screen and explain the actions of the suspects and officers. In one example, as two suspects were being searched, they appeared to be looking around for a means of escape. The narrator pointed out how their body language should have tipped off the officers. A few seconds later, both suspects took off running.

Four videos were produced using this format and they were widely accepted. Deputy Miller suggested a video of LASD deputies being critiqued, but the Force Training Unit deputies did not like the idea. Footage shot by an LASD cameraman showed two deputies handling an incident involving four suspects and multiple guns. The tactics used were very poor and reviewing them could provide an important training opportunity. The Force Training Unit deputies, however, were concerned about the deputies' reputations and possible effect on future promotions. In the original videos, the identity of the police department was blurred on the police vehicles and officers' uniforms. In this case, there was discussion about disguising the deputies' faces and voices, but it was felt they would still be identified. Eventually, they chose not to use that video. After further discussion, it

was decided to cancel the series. After all, how could we critique other agencies if we weren't willing to critique ourselves?

The Criminal Mind

In the 1980s, Deputy Miller saw a training film in which several prison inmates were interviewed and explained how, in a deadly situation, they would have an advantage over officers. Intrigued, Miller wanted to learn more. Contacting the California State Prison system, he arranged to videotape interviews with inmates. Accompanied by Video Production Specialist Eric King, they traveled to several different prisons in California, including Atascadero State Hospital for the Criminally Insane where two days were spent interviewing child molesters.

The inmates were very candid in explaining their crimes and how they committed them. Offenses ranged from narcotics to con artists to murder. A comment by one motorcycle gang member really stuck with them. He said that if he was confronted by the police, he would always be able to shoot first. When asked why, he said, "An officer has to see that I have a gun, and then he has to process all the tactics, policies, and laws before shooting. I just shoot!" Their research resulted in several insightful training programs under the title "The Criminal Mind."

Shooting at Moving Vehicles

During this time, there had been several shootings where deputies fired at moving vehicles, thinking their rounds would stop the vehicle coming at them. The Laser Village staff wanted to demonstrate that firing at moving vehicles will not stop them. They had the Video Production Unit film them as they shot at a moving vehicle with handgun rounds, rifle rounds, and shotgun slugs. After being struck with numerous rounds in different parts of the vehicle, the vehicle continued to run and move, even with flat tires. This video demonstrated that firing at a vehicle will not stop it or cause it to explode the way it might in movies or on television. The Laser Village staff taught deputies that rather than firing at moving vehicles, they should move out of the way.

Simunition Training

At the time the Laser Village staff was looking for alternatives to replace the laser equipment, paintball guns were becoming popular, so they began experimenting with them. They discovered that when a paintball gun was fired, it was louder than the laser gun, which only made a clicking sound. In addition, when a paintball

struck a deputy, they immediately could feel they were hit by gunfire, including where they were hit. Deputies reacted completely differently with the louder gunfire noise and when they were struck by the paintball round. When they were struck by the paintball rounds, they immediately moved to cover and they were much more careful when they rounded corners.

The staff decided that the training would be much more effective if they replaced the laser weapons with paintball guns. They also wanted the weapons used in training to be as close as possible to the weapons carried in the field, which, at that time, was the Beretta 92F. After some searching, they located a company in Canada (General Dynamics-Ordnance and Tactical Systems Canada Inc.) that manufactured Simunition training ammunition, similar to the paint ball rounds they wanted for tactics and survival training. The company made a replacement barrel for the Beretta and also manufactured training ammunition that could be fired from the Beretta through that barrel. The ammunition was a plastic capsule containing a colored marking detergent, which temporarily marked the clothing of the person that was shot. When fired, the round produced a loud bang and recoil that would recycle the gun, ejecting the old round and placing a new one in the chamber. The round traveled at a high enough speed to sting the person it hit, and if it hit bare skin, it would sometimes cause a bruise or slight cut.

The Laser Village staff obtained several Simunition barrels for the Berettas along with detergent marking rounds. They trained with these modified weapons and fired the marking rounds during their daily training scenarios. During the scenarios, the instructors learned how the gunfire sound, muzzle flash, and plastic round striking them would affect their reactions, making the training more realistic.

It took a while to get the Simunition barrel and ammunition approved because the range staff was concerned a deputy might inadvertently load a live round into the Simunition chamber and fire a live round at another deputy. Because of this, the staff conducted many tests using the Simunition barrel while attempting to load live rounds into the chamber. The Simunition barrel was designed so live rounds would not chamber when that barrel was on the gun. They tested numerous types of ammunition and located one World War II-era round that would, in fact, fit into the barrel. They contacted the Simunition company and explained the situation. The company redesigned the barrel so the World War II round would not fit, and if a live round was somehow fired through the barrel, it would not pass through, but instead, would blow out the top of the barrel. Once this change was made, the Simunition barrel and ammunition were approved for training by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.

This was truly state-of-the-art because the modified Beretta pistol operated as it was intended; a semi-automatic pistol where the first round was fired double-action and the remaining rounds fired single-action. When empty, the slide would lock back to the rear, allowing for a magazine exchange.

There were numerous deputies who came back through the years thanking the instructors for what they were taught. They said the realistic training was critical in helping them survive deadly life-or-death situations they had faced. It literally saved their lives.

Tactics and Survival

In 2006, the name Laser Village was changed to the Tactics and Survival (TAS) Training Center. This was largely because the name Laser Village had become antiquated and did not really describe the type of training and mission now being presented. Also in 2006, three new virtual shooting trailers were purchased by the Department from Georgia-based Firearms Training Systems (FATS) and assigned to TAS. The TAS unit began to transport these trailers to stations and bureaus where less-lethal weapons training, along with shoot-don't shoot threat assessment training, would take place. In-service deputies would roll into the station and be presented with a 20-30 minute training class.

Tactics and Survival training evolved and the TAS unit staff now provides Continued Professional Training (CPT) as well. CPT is a POST and Department-mandated course required for all field patrol personnel. Another CPT course is designed for specialized units and detectives who serve warrants and perform other high-risk jobs. CPT involves classroom instruction during the first half of the day, where tactical concepts and suspect trends in assaulting law enforcement officers are discussed, and current accepted tactics and best practices are taught. In addition, deputies learn how to think when being fired upon or assaulted. The second half of the day is scenario-based training where deputies are put through a rotation of scenarios where they are expected to make critical decisions.

Additional courses provided by the TAS unit include the Tactical Leadership Course, which teaches field operations supervisors how to supervise deputies during tactical operations, and the Tactical Combat Casualty Care Course, which teaches deputies how to treat traumatic injuries to themselves or others.

TAS Instructors

The instructors assigned to the Tactics and Survival Training Center were deputies who had been involved in shootings themselves. These deputies gained additional knowledge while working at TAS, as they attended shooting review boards and learned what deputies needed to be taught from this inside information on deputy assaults and officer-involved shootings. In addition, they researched officer-involved shootings around the country to gather critical information that could help LASD deputies survive. They also learned how deputies working patrol would react to different threats by observing them as they handled scenarios during their training. Their knowledge was utilized not only to train deputies, but to evaluate and recommend changes in policies, procedures, and tactics. They helped develop policies on foot pursuits, shooting at moving vehicles, and utilizing deadly force. They also requested training videos be produced that were necessary to train on certain topics, and they acted as technical advisors during the production of these videos.

The TAS instructors' expertise was critical when they testified during trials where deputies used force or fired their weapons. They also testified during lawsuits regarding the tactics deputies were taught and why they used deadly force in their particular situations.

Gary Lebeau returned to the TAS unit as a sergeant and used the expertise he gained while working as a tactics and survival instructor to supervise and improve the unit. Mike Reynolds returned to the TAS unit as a lieutenant and made some critical decisions that improved the safety of deputies in the field. One was to have deputies fire combat shooting in the range trailers rather than just target shooting. Another was to add tactical lights to the deputies' weapons. He was also responsible for replacing the Ithaca shotguns the Department had used for years with Remington 870 tactical shotguns, and he had the M&P handgun approved so deputies with smaller hands would be able to grip the weapon much easier, improving their shooting.

Another accomplishment of Lieutenant Reynolds was the purchase of a mobile trailer with a shooting simulator inside. This trailer was taken around to patrol stations to train deputies who were unable to attend the in-person tactics and survival training.

Active Shooter Training

The Columbine High School shooting that occurred on April 20, 1999, changed the way law enforcement handled active shooter situations. Previously, standard procedure was to contain the area and wait for the special weapons team to arrive. The SWAT team, armed with tactical weapons, heavy ballistic vests, and specialized training, would then enter the highly dangerous scene.

The two teenagers who carried out the Columbine school shooting killed twelve of their fellow students and wounded twenty-one others. One teacher was also shot and killed, while three additional individuals were wounded trying to run away. The police were criticized for setting up a containment and not entering until SWAT arrived, despite the fact shots were still being fired. In the aftermath of this tragedy, law enforcement tactics for handling active shooter situations were forced to change nationwide. No more waiting. The first officers to arrive must enter immediately to neutralize the shooter and prevent further casualties.

Deputies from the Sheriff's Department's Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB) visited Columbine High School to view where the shooting took place, as well as interview the officers who responded. The information they gathered led to the development and implementation of new tactics designed to assist deputies when confronted with an active shooter.

Handling a School Shooting

In 2001, after the SEB deputies painstakingly evaluated and refined new procedures, SEB Sergeant Jack Ewell contacted the Video Production Unit about producing the "Handling a School Shooting" training video. During the videotaping, Sergeant Ewell appeared as an on-camera narrator.

Surviving an Active Shooter

On July 20, 2012, James Eagan Holmes, dressed in tactical clothing, entered the Century 16 Movie Theater in Aurora, Colorado, during the midnight screening of "The Dark Knight Rises." Setting off tear gas grenades, he fired into the audience, killing 12 people and injuring 58. This attack, which involved the largest number of casualties in one shooting in U. S. history, prompted Bob Esson, then captain of

the LASD Training Bureau, to have a video on active shootings produced for the public.

This project was assigned to Sergeant Harry Drucker, supervisor of the Sheriff's Department's Video Production Unit. After considering various ideas, it was decided that two videos should be produced; one for the public and one for law enforcement. "Surviving an Active Shooter" trained civilians on how to escape or react to an active shooter. The other video, "Responding to an Active Shooter," taught tactics to law enforcement officers. As the executive producer, Drucker obtained $25,000 from the Department's Special Training Fund and the Board of Supervisors to provide meals for the more than 400 volunteer cast and crew members.

Video Production Specialist Vance Kotrla wrote the scripts after spending months researching active shooting incidents. TAS Sergeant Mike Harding provided technical advice during script writing, shooting, and editing. The scenarios focused on three locations: a workplace, a school, and a shopping mall. Hundreds of community members helped by volunteering as extras and crew members. Deputy Ralf Paddock, assisted by Tamica Trigo, planned the filming schedule and provided the logistics, including finding locations and cast members. Video Production Specialist Eric King was the cinematographer who supervised the camera and lighting crews. Sergeant Kevin Pearcy acted as a key grip, mainly working on lighting, while Video Production Specialists Gerardo Mendoza and Sean Jacobs were in charge of microphones and sound recording. Sean also created the graphics during editing. Vance assembled the footage during a rough edit, while final editing was conducted by Vance, Eric, and Sean. After two years of research, videotaping, and editing, the programs were finally completed.

The Academy of Television Arts & Sciences (ATAS) recognizes excellence in television and media by presenting Emmy Awards in a variety of categories. After the video aired on the L.A. County Channel, Sergeant Drucker submitted "Surviving an Active Shooter" to ATAS for recognition in the Independent Programming category. Although competing against hour-long programs airing on PBS, it still won an Emmy.

"Surviving an Active Shooter" for civilians has been shared on social media throughout the country. It has been viewed on YouTube internationally more than one million times, and it has been used by corporations around the nation to train their personnel. "Responding to an Active Shooter" for law enforcement was not only used to train deputies on the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, it has been viewed by more than 500 law enforcement agencies and military units around the world.

Terrorism & Multiple Shooter Training

In 2008, LAPD and LASD personnel worked together in committee and developed enhanced active shooter training. Although the training was the same, each agency gave it their own name. LAPD named their program "Multiple Assault Counter-Terrorism Action Capabilities," known as MACTAC. LASD named their program "Enhanced Active Shooter Strategies," known as EASS. This training taught deputies how to handle not only active shooter situations, but situations involving terrorists, IEDs, suicide bombers, and multiple shooters.

High-risk contact workshops were also created to teach deputies how to safely conduct pedestrian stops, bicycle stops, and felony stops. They also taught deputies how to properly use the ballistic shield.

Shooting Simulator

The second half of the day at TAS required deputies to react to different scenarios using the VirTra V-300 shooting simulator. In this simulator, deputies have a 300-degree view as they handle multiple scenarios. In these scenarios, deputies are taught to make critical decisions, how to deescalate situations, when to use lethal force, and how to transition from lethal to less-lethal force. The great thing about the shooting simulator was that you could play the situation back in real time, and the rounds fired by the deputy would appear exactly where they were shot at the time they were shot. This provided needed feedback for the deputies as to where they had placed their rounds.

The scenarios were filmed in segments, with the suspects and victims reacting in different ways depending on the actions of the deputy. When a deputy involved in the training reacted by giving a command or reacting to the suspect's actions, the instructor would push a button, causing the video to branch, so the suspect or victim in the scenario would react to the action taken by the deputy. If the deputy

was aggressive, it would branch off showing the suspect's reaction. If the deputy took cover, the video would branch off to show the result of that action. The role players on screen would also react to shootings, and the video would branch differently depending on whether the shots were hits or misses or if the shots were fatal to the suspect.

Officer Assaults and Shooting Research

The TAS staff conduct research on a daily basis, seeking information on officers assaulted or killed in the line of duty throughout the United States. The TAS staff also talks to the deputies who attend their classes about criminal trends. They search intelligence sources that provide information on current trends in assaulting law enforcement officers. This information, as well as current terrorism trends throughout the world, is shared with students in their classes. Much of the training conducted by TAS is dictated by critical incidents involving members of our Department that have been assessed at critical incident reviews or by the force review committee.

Review Committees

TAS personnel are members of the deputy-involved shooting rollout teams. The shooting rollout team comprises Homicide, the District Attorney's Office, Internal Affairs, and depending whether it's a hit or non-hit shooting, the Office of Inspector General, Civil Litigation, and TAS personnel. The job of TAS is to identify the good and bad tactics used by the involved deputies so they can be addressed during training.

The critical incident review is composed of a panel of three commanders. In the audience are usually TAS and Force Training Unit personnel, County Counsel, the Office of Inspector General, the LASD Attorney for Constitutional Policing, and the training personnel and captain of the unit involved in the situation.

The presentations are presented by Homicide or Internal Affairs. The critical incident reviews usually occur one week after the critical incident. The purpose of the critical incident review is to address obvious problems that require further training, rather than waiting to receive the executive force review committee findings one year later. There are times when the panel will ask TAS personnel what is being taught or what can be put out immediately to train personnel and prevent an incident like this from reoccurring.

Future of TAS

Laser Village was built in 1982, so the facility is outdated. A new Tactics and Survival facility needs to be built on a larger piece of land, with industrial and residential streets, as well as office buildings and homes that will mimic the communities we serve and provide a more realistic training atmosphere.

It is unrealistic for a staff of eight deputies and two sergeants assigned to TAS to provide current training to more than 9000 deputies on the Department. The Force Training Unit has developed a program where each unit has their own force training instructor, and they have developed a class to train these instructors. This allows personnel at all the stations and units to be trained on current force training trends. TAS has already developed the Tactics Instructor Course to train unit-level tactics instructors. This would ensure that all tactics and force training provided is current and consistent, promoting officer safety and preventing lawsuits. The TAS unit would dictate what is taught and how it is taught, as well as set up a yearly schedule of what will be taught each month across the Department. This would ensure that the same concepts are being taught at the same time. In January, for instance, sworn personnel might be trained on shooting at vehicles, in February, less-lethal weapons, and with each ensuing month, a different essential subject would be taught.

Saving Lives

The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department was a pioneer in law enforcement laser weapon training. Over the years, other law enforcement agencies have been inspired by the LASD Laser Village and laser weapon training, so they built their own Laser Villages and created their own laser training programs. There is no doubt that the research of officer-involved shootings, groundbreaking ideas, and cutting-edge technology, as well as the dedication of the instructors of officer survival training, have saved the lives of many officers throughout the years.

In Conclusion

Dale Underwood, Carrol Hogue, John Kolman, and Mike McAndrews, all innovators who researched and pioneered officer survival training, may not have realized the impact they would have on saving so many officers' lives, not only on the Sheriff's Department, but across the country. Beginning with their research and efforts, and continued with the tenacity of deputies such as J.D. Harris, the

Tactics and Survival Staff, and other dedicated Department members who analyzed and improved tactics to effectively increase the survival rate of officers involved in deadly confrontations.

Edited by Jan Jenkins (LASD Retired)